![]() The shuttle itself was considerably less risky Risk assessment of such in the PRA that is, about 65% of the directly observed empirical risk in the 113įlights was not accounted for by the PRA model. I suggested to the PRA group that on-ground analytic problemsĬontributed to something like 1.3 of the 2.0 accidents in the 113 flights. Save the crew, which was endangered by damage to the Columbia suffered at launch. In the case of the Columbia, better analysis andĭecision-making during the flight might have yielded rescue efforts to try to Sure-the Challenger would not have been launched on that very cold day (whichĬompromised the O-rings and caused the accident) if smarter engineering analysis andīetter decision-making had taken place. In the case of the Challenger, the analytic process on theĭay before the accident was seriously deficient, in the sense that-in hindsight to be The Challenger and Columbia accidents: on-ground intellectual failures in engineeringĪnalysis. (2) The PRA assessments did not take into account a major risk factor in both Was designed to replace their chippy and twiddly PP slides, which made a hash of their good technical work and made it difficult to assess the overall risk context. That intense matrix, backed up by similar more-detailed 11" by 17" arrays of riskĮstimates, be the main presentation device and analytical tool for making decisions. Risks and providing, in a comments column, relevant background for each estimate. ![]() (1) They should prepare a detailed summary matrix (on, of course, 11" by 17" paper), ordering the PRA works with a list of possible threats, estimates their probablilities and expected losses, and then seeks to assist decision-making for shuttle risk-reduction.Īfter the PRA group presented their results, I had two major suggestions: Here is a link to William Harwood's excellent account of shuttle risks in the upcoming flight, scheduled for this Saturday, context for my comments that follow.Ībout 18 months ago in Houston I reviewed the shuttle Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) material for NASA. Group with regard to the persistent disutility of using PP decks to replace technicalĮT helps NASA with Probability Risk Assessments (PRA), for upcoming launch Her experience at Microsoft is comparable to that of the NASA Return to Flight Task I wish there was some way to make this (and Tufte's The Cognitive Style of Powerpoint, and Atkinson's Beyond Bullet Points) required reading for every Microsoft employee. To be different and effective, use a well-written, detailed document for your handout and well-designed, simple, intelligent graphics for your visuals. With a written document, however, there is no reason for shallowness or ambiguity (assuming one writes well). At least they do that for a while.until they give up. When I get back home from the conference, do organizers really think I'm going to "read" pages full of PowerPoint slides? One does not read a printout of someone's two-month old PowerPoint slides, one guesses, decodes, and attempts to glean meaning from the series of low-resolution titles, bullets, charts, and clipart. Why don't conference organizers request that speakers instead send a written document that covers the main points of their presentation with appropriate detail and depth? A Word or PDF document that is written in a concise and readable fashion with a bibliography and links to even more detail, for those who are interested, would be far more effective. PowerPoint is a terrible tool for making written documents, that's what word processors are for. PowerPoint (or Keynote) is a tool for displaying visual information, information that helps you tell your story, make your case, or prove your point. Yet, this is a typical, acceptable approach. Tonight I was reading through one of the blogs I've recently added to my aggregator, the most-excellent Presentation Zen (by Garr Reynolds), and I came across a post entitled " The sound of one room napping." It included this wonderful passage, which sums up beautifully what I've been trying to say to the people around me at Microsoft:Īttempting to have slides serve both as projected visuals and as stand-alone handouts makes for bad visuals and bad documentation. One of the latter has been the organizatational dependence on "the deck" (that is, Powerpoint files) as the standard mechanism for conveying nearly all information. However, there have also been a few things that i've found extraordinarily disheartening. There are many things I've been delighted and impressed by during the nearly five months I've now spent at Microsoft. Elizabeth Lane Lawley, a professor visiting Microsoft, comments on "the culture of the
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